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DIFFERING EFFECTS: THE RESOURCE CURSE IN
SEPARATIST CONFLICTS
W. Scott Miller
Abstract: Despite considerable research on the relationship between natural resources and civil
wars, minimal investigation has been conducted regarding the effects on separatist conflicts.
Previous literature in the field has recognized seemingly different effects, but none have focused
on these differences. Using 10 cases, this study fills the gap in the research. The observable
results support the idea that the potential effects are unique to separatist conflicts and not civil
war in general. Such results demonstrate the variety of mechanisms through which a variable
can generate observable changes.
The value of natural resources in today’s modern economy cannot be understated. In fact,
many nations’ economies depend upon abundant natural resources that are concentrated within their
borders. Naturally, nations will act to maintain control over these regions. So, it is theoretically
logical (and, according to some sources, statistically supported) that a correlation exists between
abundance of natural resources and the outbreak of civil wars (de Soysa 2002; Ross 2004a).
However, because of the complexity inherent in the causality of such conflicts, numerous
mechanisms have been proposed to relate the two. This paper adds to the vigorous academic
debate by examining the relationship between valuable natural resource abundance and separatist
conflicts. The following section explains the areas of study that have been previously pursued,
providing the reasons this study was conducted. Then, in the second section, the discussion
explores this study’s design. The third section describes the criteria and justification for the study’s
case selection. Beyond that, the fourth section provides general and case by case analyses with
regard to the study’s hypotheses in order facilitate comparison with expected outcomes (e.g. a direct
causal relationship between resource wealth and separatist conflict). Finally, the last section delivers
final conclusions regarding the study’s focus and offers possible avenues for further research in
future studies. However, before explaining my own proposed part in the academic debate, it is
critical to understand existing research in order to shed light on my intended contributions.

The “Resource Curse” & Academic Discussion
For many years, researchers have sought to understand the causes of war between and
within sovereign nations. Recently, an explosion of research has been dedicated to natural resource
abundance as a causal factor of conflicts. In what has been dubbed the “resource curse” by the
modern intellectual community, some researchers have proposed that regions possessing an
abundance of natural resources are more prone to the onset of violent conflict than regions lacking
such resources. While a correlation between the two has been observed by members of the research
community (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2002; Ross 2004a, 2004b), a debate still rages amongst
scholars regarding the validity and nature of the correlation and any causal mechanisms that might
explain the relationship. Originating in aforementioned research, this discussion has spawned a
multitude of new studies continuing the debate over the supposed “resource curse.”
Investigations into the curse began to emerge in the mid-1990s as researchers were
completing initial studies after the end of the Cold War. The standard unit of measure for natural
resource availability—the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP—in many studies was first
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995). These scholars sought to explain the question of why
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countries abundant in natural resources often grew more slowly economically. Soon, researchers
seeking to understand causes of violent conflicts started using the ratio as their main proxy for
resource abundance, beginning with Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2002), who opened the flood gates to
discussion.
By the early part of this decade, numerous other scholarly reports proposed mechanisms,
attempting to explain the correlation between the curse and warfare (e.g. de Soysa 2002; Addison, Le
Billon, & Murshed 2002). In the din of this discussion, scholars like Marta Reynal-Querol (2002)
and Michael Ross (2004a, 2004b) began exploring the relationships between the curse and civil wars,
as opposed to general armed conflict. Following Ross’ projects, various scholars published works
challenging the previous findings that linked the resource curse to conflict onset, whether civil or
international. For instance, Buhaug and Rød (2006) argued that local determinants and measures—
not national ones—better reflected the causalities behind civil wars. Adding to the debate, several
studies contended that examining natural resources as a causal factor of conflicts is not helpful
(Walter 2006; Wennmann 2007). In fact, a study by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) proposed that
the ratio between commodity exports and GDP displays resource dependence, not abundance as
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) intended. In their work, Brunnschwelier and Bulte changed the unit of
measure and suddenly the effects of the supposed resource curse reversed, becoming beneficial
(2008). As a result, the debate was, and still is, hotly contested and heavily researched.
Strengths & Contributions
Through its hypotheses, this study will produce findings that contribute to the larger
scholarly debate in several ways. First, in all my research, I have not encountered any studies that
specifically focused on the relationship between natural resource abundance and separatist conflicts.
At most, separatist conflicts have received cursory investigations in studies (Ross 2004b), or
individualized case studies that are difficult to expand to the broader community (Oyefusi 2008).
Shockingly, Ross even acknowledged the apparent differences between effects of natural resources
on civil wars and the more specific separatist wars (2004b). Despite this admission by Ross, no one
has yet produced a study focusing on resource abundance and separatist conflicts. To me, this
represents a significant gap in scholarly understanding (or at least the debate) of the resource curse.
Second, since Ross’ small-N comparative case design (2004b) did not focus on separatist
conflicts, it is possible to modify and re-apply his model to allow comparisons between his
conclusions and this study’s. In addition to the three separatist cases that Ross studied (Indonesia,
Burma/Myanmar, and Sudan), this study includes seven new case subjects which will increase the
value of comparison between the two. Furthermore, this study is highly valuable for comparison for
another reason: Ross restricted his cases to conflicts that occurred within the interval of 1990-2000.
Consequently, as much as seven years of data (this varies with each case to as little as four) can be
added to his model.
Third, many scholars debate the validity of units of measure (e.g. primary exports/GDP)
used in large-N studies, like those conducted by Reynal (2002) or Fearon & Laitin (2003). By
concentrating on a specific group of resources as applied to a small-N study like Ross’ (2004b), this
study circumvents complications that have plagued large-N studies, namely that aggregation of the
ratio “does not distinguish between different resource types…,” that such a study may “suffer from
endogeneity…,” and potential spuriousness (Lujala et al. 2005, 542). This approach also has the
added benefit of allowing me to examine the cases using multiple data sets, found in previous studies
(e.g. DIADATA by Gilmore, Lujala, Gleditsch, & Rød [2005]). This is a benefit that other small-N
studies seem to have overlooked and that large-N studies are incapable of pursuing feasibly.
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Additionally, the DIADATA, PETRODATA, and United States Energy Information Administration
(EIA) data have been updated annually since their creation and therefore contain significant
information beyond what Ross selected for his study.
Design Complications
However, small-N studies are not without complications. Foremost, by using the small-N
comparative cases design format, my study will significantly decrease in its generalizability. That
said, generalizability would likely have suffered from the small overall pool of separatist conflicts in
resource qualifying nations; therefore, the sacrifice is acceptable. Nonetheless, as Lujala et. al. (2005)
denote, I must be aware of the danger of generalizing from a small case study.
Additionally, a small-N study is weak because it is easier for an exterior bias (unknown third
variable) to affect the results. In order to address this issue, I plan to select as diverse cases as
possible, which will be problematic given the small pool. For example, half of the cases that this
study uses are African nations because more separatist conflicts fulfilled the inclusion requirements
in Africa than in other regions. To combat this bias, this study gathers a South American case and
four Asian cases. However, regional bias remains the most threatening bias to the study’s validity
and is considered throughout the analysis and conclusion processes. Ideally, this study will avoid
other sorts of biases by selecting nations having both rich and poor populations (drawing on
individual per capita income statistics, as done by Hale [2000]) and possessing several different
natural resources. Unfortunately, given the nature of this study’s proposals it is illogical that a nation
could be both “rich” in individual per capita income and yet still create a grievance strong enough to
motivate separatist conflict (see Hypothesis 1).
Lastly, small-N studies can be harmed by the appearance of many plausible mechanisms that
large-N studies could eliminate via sheer numbers. Hopefully, these controls will allow the study to
evaluate the two propositions in depth, rather than addressing a number of potential mechanisms (as
Ross 2004b does). This will in turn, optimistically, restrict the potential ways that spurious
mechanisms can enter the study. Of course, isolating the independent and dependent variables will
be my greatest obstacle; thus, it will be imperative to focus on maximizing the purity of my work
with special attention to the selection of cases and design of the study.

Research Design
Then, what can I expect to add to such a thoroughly studied, though tumultuous, academic
examination? This section addresses how, after reviewing the diverse literature, I intend to modify
and apply aspects of Michael Ross’ case study examination (2004b) to separatist conflicts. Put
simply, I am interested in how—not why or if—natural resources can affect separatist conflicts
through several hypotheses. To begin, nations that depend heavily upon resources to generate
revenue are exploiting resources that are frequently found in only a fraction of the nation’s territory.
Thus, the revenues from such resources often are split amongst the entire state, as opposed to
benefiting the region of extraction more heavily. In this scenario, it is logical that exploitation of this
nature could foster separatist sentiments. Such a concept is articulated as the following:
H1: Resource wealth provides a motivating mechanism for separatist movements when
citizens feel “insufficiently compensated” by the state for the “expropriation” of their
region’s resources (Ross 2004b, 41).
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For this hypothesis to be valid, several criteria must be fulfilled. For instance, it is critical
that “…the conflict began after the separatist region was identified as having … resource wealth”
(Ross 2004b, 42). Next, separatists target resource related industry or infrastructure, most
indicatively in their region, for their attacks (Ross). Above all, though, the observation that
separatists discuss the “unfair distribution of resource wealth in its propaganda” is most revealing
(Ross, 42). The third observation is the most important because it confirms that the separatists have
identified an injustice which they seek to correct. It also suggests that attacks carried out against
resource infrastructure and production sites are primarily intended to convey a message, rather than
solely to hinder the enemy.
In order to observe these standards, it is paramount to establish the extent of
production/extraction of the pertinent natural resources, which was shown by Lujala, Gleditsch, &
Gilmore (2005) to have a statistically significant effect on diamond related conflicts. As reported by
the EIA, annual estimates of each nation’s production and refining capabilities can be examined as
representative of this measure. Also, dates of initial production (with precision ratings again) and
geographic location of each resource can be obtained from the UCDP-PRIO PETRODATA and
DIADATA datasets, which are updated annually, similar to the ACD (Lujala, Rød, & Thieme 2007;
Gilmore, Lujala, Gleditsch, & Rød 2005).
Moving on, this study is intended to address more than the motivating effects of resource
wealth on populations that believe themselves under compensated. Ross, in his study (2004b),
found that resources can have a “prolonging effect” on a conflict by funding the war effort. So, it is
logical to investigate the following:
H2: Resource rich regions involved in separatist conflicts create more prolonged violent
conflict with the governments they are attempting to break away from by providing an
exportable means of revenue generation for the rebels.1
If valid, several things will be seen in the cases. First, the region must have identified the
presence—or lack—of abundant natural resources prior to the conflict. This measure is critical to
both of my hypotheses and more subtly nuanced than Ross’. In addition to defining and identifying
supposed abundance, conflict must not have arisen before the resources were discovered or in
production, therefore thorough examination is required. Ross solely utilized the ratio of primary
exports to GDP to determine abundance. Unfortunately, this aggregate prevents distinguishing
between effects of one resource over another (Lujala et. al, 2005). Therefore, it is more defensible
to consider multiple indicators simultaneously. In addition to the GDP ratio, a nation’s proven
resource reserves and percentage of GDP attributable to specific resource exports will be included
as well. These statistics are reported in annual analyses produced by the EIA. Determining the date
of awareness of resources will be trickier; however, the PETRODATA, DIADATA, and the EIA’s
data provide, at the least, approximate dates of discovery for the major resources.
Second, it is important to establish the duration of the separatist conflicts in order to
examine the resource specific effects (if any) that can be observed. To this end, the UCDP-PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) provides data on conflicts that have accrued more than 25 battle
deaths. The data includes conflicts from 1946 to the present and has been updated annually since its

1

This hypothesis assumes that the government faction is drawing funding from the natural resource(s) revenues in
addition to their other (if any) means of funding. The “prolonging effect” is only interested in whether or not the
separatist faction is funded by natural resources, thereby prolonging the conflict, rather than resulting in defeat.
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first production (Gleditsch et. al, 2002). Specifically, the ACD provides dates of conflict initiation,
termination, and ratings for the precision of date determination.
Thirdly, exploitation of profits from natural resources to purchase arms would be indicative
of resource abundance prolonging the conflict. This is particularly true of the rebel groups, as they
can be assumed to lack other means of funding. However, since sovereign governments likely
control the majority of available resources, it is also plausible that they would seek to utilize profits
from resources in this manner. Examining this indicator will require case by case investigation
through reliable sources of information, such as journals and global news organizations.

Case Selection
The following section discusses the parameters and corresponding justifications by which
this study’s cases were examined and selected. To begin, Ross employed a “most likely” method of
selecting cases in which he claims that “… there was prima facie evidence that natural resources had
influenced the conflict” (2004b, 46). In other words, because the study seeks to examine how
resources affect conflicts, cases were largely selected because evidence from the EIA or other
scholarly sources suggested that resources played a role.2 Because of the nature of this study, some
of the cases were required to have significant resource abundance and an active separatist conflict at
some point since 1990. Hence, from the UCDP-PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset, all civil wars
since 1946 were included for this study’s sample. Of these, only conflicts that began or ended after
1990 were further examined.
Next, a rigid definition of “natural resources” was established and used in distinguishing
possible cases from the rest. Potential conflicts were required to exhibit abundance of oil, natural
gas, coal, and/or diamonds based on three “all or nothing” standards. The cases either surpassed
the established minimums or were eliminated from the sample. Nations were considered to have
resource abundance by ranking in the respective continent’s top five for proven reserves of that
resource.3 It was also required that exports of the resource in question accounted for more than
25% of the nation’s GDP. Lastly, the nations were required to produce a minimum average daily or
yearly amount of the resource for at least one year during the separatist conflict (see Table 1).
Table 1: Specific Resource Production Parameters Used in Case Selection
Resource
Production Minimum; Export Minimum
Oil
350,000 barrels per day (bbl/d); 275,000 bbl/d
Natural Gas
2 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d); 1 Bcf/d
Coal
50 million short tons per year (MMst); 50 MMst
Diamonds
Account for >5% world’s production OR >700,000 carats
produced since 1992
* = Diamond production statistics were adhered to less stringently than the other resources’ requirements because of
difficulties in accounting for illicit trading in some regions, e.g. Sierra Leone

2

For further explanation of the “most likely” method, see Ross 2004b, p. 46.
In considering Asian nations, I choose to overlook Middle Eastern nations from the rankings. This decision was made
because the Middle Eastern nations would have excluded any other Asian nations from the study based on the “Top 5”
requirement, despite fulfillment of all other requirements. Once those nations were excluded, Azerbaijan and Indonesia
fulfilled all requisites. Myanmar (Burma) was only in the top 15 Asian nations for reserves, but fulfilled all others. This
discrepancy was overlooked in light of Ross’ use of the nation as a case in his work (2004b).
3
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Additionally, cases were restricted (with noted exceptions) to separatist conflicts that were
coded as having produced more than 1,000 battle-related deaths over the course of their conflict.
The ACD also includes any conflict with more than 25 battle-related deaths, but coded conflicts that
had surpassed the more common threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths. In his work, Ross defined
the civil conflicts in his sample with the 1,000 death threshold. In the interest of maintaining
parallels to his model, it was desirable and did not present serious difficulty to use the same
definition.
The cases include five African, one South American, and three Asian nations (listed in Table
2). The selections shown in Table 2 create an acceptable representation of nations of different
regional, socioeconomic, and governmental types. So, while the study has very low generalizability
to the world in general, a sufficient mix of cases has been achieved to optimize the isolation of
variables from extraneous contamination.
At this point, several of the “most likely” system’s biases deserve revisiting. This group of
cases does not constitute a representative sample to test whether or not resource wealth initiates
separatist conflicts. Again, these cases facilitate the examination of proposed mechanisms of how
resource abundance can affect conflict. So, if the mechanisms are demonstrated within these
nations (in general), those mechanisms can be assumed to be plausible. If, however, the opposite is
true and the mechanisms are not demonstrated, a convincing argument (more so than the former)
can be made that “it is unlikely to be valid more generally” (Ross 2004b, 48). Moreover, conclusions
may only be made within each nation; international conclusions are critically susceptible to
intervening variables and other contaminations.
Table 2: Separatist Wars Linked to the Resource Curse, 1990-2008
Country
Angola
Azerbaijan
Colombia
Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC)
Indonesia – Aceh
Indonesia – East Timor
Myanmar (Burma)
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Sudan

Resources
Oil, Diamonds
Oil
Oil
Diamonds

Conflict Duration
1975-95
1991-94
1964-2008 (ongoing)
1998-2008 (ongoing)

Natural Gas, Coal
Natural Gas, Coal
Natural Gas
Oil, Natural Gas
Diamonds3
Oil

1989-2005
1975-98
1959-2008 (ongoing)
2004-20081 (ongoing)
1991-20002
1971-2008 (ongoing)

Note: Italicized nations were included in the study conducted by Ross (2004b)
1 = the ACD lists this conflict as resolved in 2004; however, the EIA’s country analysis denotes that 20% of
Nigeria’s oil production was completely halted by militant attacks in 2006-07
2 = Termination date not listed in ACD, taken from Ross, 2004b
3
= Only case not to meet production requirements (diamond production = 3% of total world production;
400,000 carats since 1992)

Findings of Case Analysis
In this section, I explain the results of case study analyses, first in a general sense and then
through country specific explanations. Overall, of the ten cases this study investigated, six
demonstrate a relationship to natural resources through one or both of the proposed mechanisms,
while four do not demonstrate a relationship between their resource wealth and separatist conflicts
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(See Table 3). Interestingly, all six of the cases that related to natural resources showed evidence of
motivation originating with non-compensation, supporting Hypothesis 1, to varying degrees.
Contrarily, only three exhibited qualities that would allow Hypothesis 2 to be deemed plausible. In
examining the individual case analyses, the six supportive cases are discussed first, followed by the
explanation of the four unsupportive cases.
Supporting Cases
Angola & U<ITA
As with several other cases, Angola has been involved in a conflict with more than one
organization that can be tied to the resource curse, though only one fulfills my requirements.
Angola’s conflict with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is an
excellent case because the conflict is a straightforward example of natural resources providing
motivation for and prolonging a conflict. To begin, in their study (2001), Frynas & Wood claimed
that the conflict “seriously affected the Angolan oil industry and put oil operations at risk” (592). In
particular, UNITA focused their attacks on onshore oilfields, even overrunning the Soyo fields in
1993. Additionally, the organization quickly became known for their “kidnapping and killing of oil
company staff and sabotage of oil installations” (Frynas & Wood 2001, 592). Most importantly,
though, UNITA was prompted to conflict by what they interpreted as unfair compensation for their
territory’s oil production.
Furthermore, the Angolan case with UNITA demonstrates the prolonging effect of natural
resources too. In a country that had generated some 2.5 million carats of diamonds in 1992, it is
believed that “[d]iamonds funded the … rebel group during Angola’s long civil war” (Collier 2003,
41). In their 2005 dataset and study, Gilmore, Lujala, Gleditsch, & Rød claim that Angola’s
diamond exports were skewed because UNITA undeniably exported illicit diamonds to generate
revenue. Of course, this in turn allowed them to fund their side of the war. With the MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Angola’s ruling party) relying heavily on oil
generated revenues to fund their military forces, the conflict between the MPLA and UNITA clearly
displays the earmarks of a resource cursed separatist conflict.
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Table 3: Results of Case Study Analyses
Countries

Angola
Azerbaijan
Colombia
Democratic
Republic of Congo

Indonesia

Motivation
Mechanism (H1)

Prolonging
Effect (H2)

Supports

Supports

Rejects

Rejects

Supports

Rejects

BDK (Bundu Dia Kongo)*

Rejects

Indeterminate
(Rejects)

GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or
Free Aceh Movement)

Supports

Rejects

East Timor

Rejects

Rejects

Opposition Organization
UNITA (National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola)
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia)

Myanmar (Burma)

SSA (Shan State Army)
Rejects
Rejects
NDPVF (Niger Delta People’s
Nigeria
Supports
Supports
Volunteer Force)
Sierra Leone
RUF (Revolutionary United Front)
Supports
Supports
SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation
Sudan
Supports
Rejects
Movement/Army)
*
= one of a number of international/national participants in “the great African war” (Olsson & Fors
2004, 322), but is the only separatist organization listed by the ACD
Colombia & FARC
Colombia’s situation is much more convoluted than Angola’s. Their conflict with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been long and arduous, showcasing several
of the criteria of a natural resource motivated conflict. As reported by the Council of Foreign
Relations in 2008, FARC (ironically, a communist based organization) openly advocates privatizing
the oil sector, which is currently controlled entirely by the Colombian government. It is plausible
that FARC’s interest in the oil sector is only superficial. Yet, even if this is the case, then their
propaganda still implies the existence of a sizable number of people to whom they are trying to
appeal as well as recruit. Consequently, it is logical to conclude that a number (if not all) of the
FARC’s fighters are in some way displeased with oil extraction and its revenue’s distribution.
Moreover, FARC has been linked to numerous crimes and attacks against the oil sector and their
personnel, another gauge for the motivation mechanism. For instance, FARC was recently linked to
the 2004 murder of a PdVSA (the Colombian oil company) engineer. With a reputation for brutality
against PdVSA officials, it is clear that FARC is driven by the motivation mechanism.
In terms of the prolonging effect of natural resources, however, the effects of oil are less
apparent. While FARC is known for extorting protection from oil companies and kidnapping their
employees, these actions do not represent a major source of revenue for the separatists. Their
revenue is largely generated by what some scholars (e.g. Ross 2004b; Collier 2003) consider another
kind of resource wealth: drugs, in this case cocaine. According to Collier, when Peru defeated “the
Shining Path guerrillas… in the early 1990s, drug production shifted to … the FARC” (2003, 45).
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Nonetheless, this study does not consider drug related revenue as demonstrative of the effects of
natural resources. So, in light of their drug revenues, FARC’s revenue gathering activities against the
oil sector do not seem to represent much of their funding and refutes natural resource as a
prolonging factor in their conflict.
Indonesia & GAM
The Free Aceh Movement’s (GAM) separatist war with Indonesia stemmed from a number
of major disagreements, among those was the distribution of revenue generated from the region’s
natural gas reserves. Perfectly matching the motivation hypothesis, GAM used propaganda claiming
that “income flowed out of the region to the center, and outsiders” (Global Security, 2006). These
outsiders then came to occupy an unfair percentage of the resource occupations. This struck a
chord with the Acehnese people, many of whom felt exploited by the Indonesian government.
Underscoring the strength of this sentiment, the gas revenue issue was explicitly included in the
2005 Indonesia-GAM peace agreement that ended some 20 years of fighting. In it, GAM and the
Acehnese agreed to remain a part of Indonesia, but with several government concessions toward
autonomy. Specifically, one of the main tenets of the agreement entitled the Aceh region to no less
than 70% of all revenues generated from the region’s natural gas production. Clearly, the inclusion
of such a clause in the two party’s peace treaty demonstrates the weight of unfair compensation and
employment as a motivating factor in the Indonesia-GAM conflict.
Contrarily, the natural gas of the Aceh region did not seem to extend the length of the
conflict in any way. Throughout the conflict, GAM was forced to fund their efforts without a large
scale income from natural gas revenues, largely because the reserves were either offshore or
controlled by the government and thus safe from capture. Consequently, GAM’s resolve or other
factors, rather than funding from natural resources, appear to have prolonged the war. Therefore,
the prolonging effect is unsupported by this case.
<igeria & <DPVF
In the Niger Delta, the conflict raging over oil production between Nigerian forces and the
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) separatists is a keystone example of the motivation
mechanism for this study. The Niger Delta region “accounts for over 90% of the nation’s oil
revenue, and its … minority ethnic groups have borne a disproportionate share of the cost … for
which they believe they have not been adequately compensated” (Oyefusi 2008, 540). As a result,
the Delta is wracked with violence that ranges from attacks on oilfields to kidnapping and other oilrelated violence perpetrated by the NDPVF. In fact, the EIA reports that “militant activity in the
Niger Delta … has severely impacted Nigeria’s oil production potential by shutting-in an estimated
20 percent of total production” (EIA 2007, Paragraph 1). Accordingly, this conflict validates the
motivation mechanism through all measures.
In addition, the Nigeria-NDPVF dispute seems to be somewhat dependent on oil for
funding, through “revenues from looting and obstructing oil extraction … as well as kidnap ransoms
in the course of executing rebellion” (Oyefusi 2008, 542). With an economy in which 95% percent
of total export revenues are generated by the oil sector (EIA, 2008, Paragraph 1), it is undeniable
that opportunities abound for such rebel activities. Since evidence is still being uncovered as the
conflict continues, it is unclear to what extent the separatists depend on such activities for funding.
With that acknowledgment, since evidence indicates that the NDPVF draws some significant
amount of funding through exploitation of the oil industry, the prolonging effect is supported.
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Sierra Leone & the RUF
Sierra Leone’s conflict with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) is the third of four that
support both hypotheses. In terms of motivation, the RUF used propaganda to take advantage of
over a decade’s worth of governmental and elite exploitation of the nation’s diamond resources.
“Politicians … made a fortune, but the ordinary Sierra Leonean standard of living continued to
decline through the 1980s” (Zack-Williams 1999, 148). In turn, this allowed the RUF to recruit
from the lower, exploited classes effectively with such propaganda. Soon after the conflict’s
initiation in 1991, attacks against the diamond fields were carried out. Throughout the fighting, the
rebels “continued to hit at targets … occupying for a time the diamond fields of Kono District”
(Zack-Williams 1999, 150), the prized diamond producing region of Sierra Leone. Consequently, it
is clear that the RUF targeted the diamond production and its revenue distribution from the outset.
After their recruitment tactics, it is undeniable that the distribution of diamond revenues fuelled the
motivating mechanism for many participants in the RUF’s campaign against Sierra Leone.
Equally, the Sierra Leone-RUF conflict exhibits qualities of a prolonging effect derived from
diamonds. The fact that “both sides fought to control the diamond fields of Kono, Kenema, and
the garrison towns” (Zack-Williams 1999, 158) points to the value the fields held for each side.
While it is reasonable to surmise that the sides sought to eliminate their enemy’s source of funding,
it is even more rational that the sides were fighting for the opportunity to exploit the fields, rather
than to deny their foes. With both sides drawing funds from the diamond fields, the RUF’s
separatist war against Sierra Leone exists as a quality example of the resource curse in warfare.
Sudan & SPLM/A
The last of the supporting cases, the war between Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement Army (SPLM/A), also supports the first mechanism, though in a unique manner. In
Sudan, the government has displaced inhabitants of the region’s in which oil is concentrated. Of
course, this forced abandonment of their homes has inspired incredible resentment. Because of this
direct cause, the SPLM/A has “increasingly focused on the oilfields” (Rone 2003, 506) with their
attacks. Naturally, the SPLM/A’s propaganda is geared to attract those refugees and disgruntled
southern Sudanese that have been forced away from the oilfields. Undeniably, the Sudan-SPLM/A
conflict demonstrates the motivating mechanism.
On the other hand, the SPLM/A has not been able to draw upon oil revenues as a result of
their inherent displacement from the region. The Sudanese government has taken steps to draft and
train brigades, specifically to defend the oilfields from attacks. This does not mean that attacks have
not been made against the infrastructure or personnel of the oil companies, but the SPLM/A has
had difficulty in claiming and maintaining control of the oilfields and their operations.
Consequently, it is challenging to argue that the SPLM/A has derived significant funding from the
oil sector. Thus, the prolonging effect must be rejected in this case.
Rejecting Cases
Of the following analyses, the first is an indeterminate case, but was included in the ‘refuted’
category for both hypotheses because incomplete evidence prohibited a logical conclusion of
support or its lack from being made. The latter three are grouped into a single section for the sake
of brevity as the discussion is based on general information that was inherently necessary to
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understand the conflicts. In depth analysis, beyond explaining the rejection of this study’s
mechanisms, would be unnecessary speculation.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) & BDK4
The DRC’s “great African war” (Olsson & Fors 2004) was started in 1998 when overflow of
the Rwandan Tutsi-Hutu conflict resulted in cross border fighting between the DRC and Rwanda.
The conflict quickly pulled a number of nations into the fighting that eventually included Congolese,
Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Ugandan involvement among others. This does not include the
“multitude of rebel and national armies” that became involved in the conflict, such as the Bundu
Dia Kongo (BDK) rebels (Olsson & Fors 2004, 321). However, with so many factions involved,
and the inherent confusion of warfare, scholars have yet to fully untangle the mess of motives.
Hence, BDK’s involvement in the conflict is difficult to construe as an example of the motivation
mechanism.
Similarly, this case is too convoluted to either support or reject the hypotheses with any level
of confidence, but in Olsson & Fors’s words from their 2004 study, “[n]atural resource extraction …
fuelled the continuation of the conflict in Congo” (326). This is particularly true of the DRC, “a
country with conditions for … huge mineral exploitation” (Collier 2003) that allowed it to feed the
conflict. Unfortunately, it is unclear to what extent any specific separatist factions have benefited
from the diamonds of the DRC, but—due to lack of evidence—it must be assumed that they did
not. Nevertheless, as put by Olsson & Fors (2004), Congolese diamonds funded the DRC’s war and
perhaps the Ugandan and Rwandan involvement through illicit exports (demonstrated by a spike in
diamond exports after these nations entered the conflict, without having significant diamond
reserves). Thus, information emerging about the recently concluded conflict (2007 according to the
ACD) may eventually reveal funding for separatist factions via diamonds. Hence, it would be
unjustified to claim support for the prolonging effect and must be presumed nonexistent.
Azerbaijan & the Republic of <agorno-Karabakh; Indonesia & East Timor; Myanmar & SSA
All three of these cases were deemed to lack evidence that supported the two proposed
mechanisms. None of them demonstrated a significant inclination toward violence that targeted
resource infrastructure, nor did they promote propaganda aimed at exacerbating ideas of unfair
compensation or distribution of revenues. Interestingly though, all three of these cases have
achieved a greater level of peace, or at least ceasefire, than was generally observed in the cases above.
For instance, East Timor was given complete autonomy by Indonesia in 1995. The Republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan pursued peace mediation intermittently between 1991 and 1999
that led to a ceasefire and political discussion of their differences (which do not apparently include
oil sector topics). Lastly, perhaps the most volatile case in the entire study, Myanmar and the SSA
currently co-exist in a standstill with several other states in the nation. Like several other states, the
SSA is being allowed to essentially self-govern without official acknowledgment by the government

4

The war in the DRC is incredibly complex with a multitude of involved states and non-state factions. The ACD
lists the BDK as the only involved separatist faction, but the BDK does not fulfill this study’s 1,000 battle deaths
threshold.. However, given the magnitude of the war (some casualty estimates reach into the millions, see Olsson &
Fors 2004, 321), I have chosen to overlook this study’s required minimum of 1,000 battle deaths to include the BDK
because the DRC’s war is an excellent example of natural resources prolonging the government’s involvement in a
conflict without necessarily motivating the participants.
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of Myanmar; it is unclear whether the national government intends to release grant Shan state (or
any of its other rebellious states) autonomy or not.
So, regardless of their differences, these three cases are all similar in three critical ways. First,
they have considerable natural resource reserves and either have an ongoing conflict or have
experienced a period of separatist conflict. Second, they do not exhibit any of the qualities of this
study’s hypotheses. Third, all three have achieved some level of resolution via peaceful, reasonably
diplomatic methods. The last point is particularly curious because, while some of their wars have
ended, the cases that support this study’s hypotheses have only achieved peace by forcing surrender
or flight of the opposition. Since these three cases did not support this study’s hypothesis and used
diplomacy to achieve peace, it appears that some other effect may be occurring outside this study’s
area of investigation.

Conclusion
At the beginning of this study, I provided the background and justification for research that
investigated how a nation’s resource abundance influenced separatist conflicts within those nations.
In the subsequent sections, justification of this study’s design and case selection was plainly
discussed. Following that, general and case by case analyses were provided that would validate
several conclusions. First, six of the ten separatist conflicts investigated displayed behavior that
supported the first hypothesis, or the “motivation mechanism.” This supports Ross’ conclusion that
separatist conflicts can be instigated, at least partially, by a group that feels it has been unfairly
compensated for their labor and resources. In turn, this conclusion indicates a difference between
the civil wars that Ross studied with his similar model (from which he concluded that no civil wars
were affected by this mechanism; 2004b) and the separatist conflicts in this study. Therefore, it is
logical to support the idea that civil and separatist wars are, in fact, affected differently by natural
resource abundance.
Second, four of the ten cases were found to not support either hypothesis. However, these
observations were nonetheless useful as they revealed an interesting pattern. In those nations that
lacked a correlation to either of this study’s hypotheses, peace was achieved between the disputing
parties via diplomatic, peaceful channels, although Myanmar and the SSA are technically still at war.
In contrast, any resolution to the first six cases’ conflicts resulted from the elimination, suppression,
or dispersal of their opponents through violent means, with the notable exception of the IndonesiaGAM conflict. This curious disparagement provides an excellent opportunity for future research.
Finally, based on this study’s generally supportive evidence, I support Ross’ conclusion that
“resources appear to play a different role in separatist conflicts than in nonseparatist conflicts” (Ross
2004b, 63). This study found similar results as Ross despite use of a stricter definition of resources
than Ross employed in his study, which suggests the type of resource is a non-factor in these
mechanisms as observed in separatist conflict. With this in mind, this study still leaves several
important questions for further research. First, because this study operated on a “most likely” basis,
an investigation of the role of resources in all separatist wars in general would be a useful addition to
the existing body of knowledge. Second, given the differences between methods of conflict
resolution, research into why resources held considerable weight in some cases, but not others,
would also contribute significantly to understanding the resource curse. Without such research, the
resource curse will remain open to debate.
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